Machines that Kill

This is an extension of a summary paper that was written for a class so it references a presentation by a professor here at the University of Minnesota and his work on the legality of drone strikes. I found it an interesting topic and continued on past the one page limit so I thought I'd put it up here...

‘Machines that Kill’ (or, perhaps, ‘Skynet is coming, run for your lives’)

Drunk Predator Drone @drunkenpredator

guess what bitches I'M FLYING OVER SYRIA happy friday news dump

Earlier this week, Professor Oren Gross of the Institute for International Legal and Security Studies gave a presentation on ‘drones’ entitled, Machines that Kill. Prof Gross started out with a brief overview of war and how it has been an “integral part of mankind.” Of course, the classic example of the integration of war and technology is the longbow at the battle of Agincourt and Prof Oren dutifully recounted this story as he progressed through the ages, intertwining war and technology. A highlight for me was his recounting of PW Singer’s work (as I’m a huge fan) about the “stretching of the battlefield.” For example it took 500 Grecian Hoplites to cover the space of a football field but in today’s modern military environment of the networked ‘battle space’ one soldier could cover 780 football fields.

E-IR

Also, in case anyone actually is reading this, Erik was published(?) at E-IR!

Link to Article


Go check it out!

Salifi Categorization

Recently found a great article on Salafist groups, the biggest thing I found interesting about it was this:

The different contextual readings have produced three major factions in the com- munity: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. The purists emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast, emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolu- tion. All three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief. 

Then I found another article (this time a capstone project from GWU) that had summary of it with further explanation of the groups and their attitudes towards each other. The best bits I have below, but it seems that there is some literature that explains differing motivations of Islamic groups not by their interpretation of Islam, but by their differing opinions of their capability to influence change. It solidifies the view of Terrorism as being an (objectively abhorrent from the outsiders perspective) extension of political action in the mind of the actor.

 Salafis believe that their “actions should not create a greater evil, such as weakening Islamic (Salafi) propagation” and they are against declaring the state an infidel because that leads to reprisals, which are a “greater evil.” Thus, purists are not above attempting to influence the state, but it should be through a mass movement of “believers,” gained through propagation, not through political action, which leads to corruption, or violence, which puts the Muslim community in danger.

Essentially the purists feel that extending civil society and their control over the public sphere to institute change.


 About politicos:

politicos do not challenge the purists on the Salafi creed; rather, they believe that that purists’ rejection of modern politics has made them irrelevant and out of touch with Muslims. Since physically combating the state would lead to more problems, they believe that the only way to remain relevant, incite change, and gain power is through participating in politics. 

engagement with the state is imperative here. I have nothing other than a hunch to back this up, but I feel that this cadre attracts more moderate muslim participants. If anyone has anything to support this I would love to know for certain. 




And finally the Jihadis:

believing the purists and politicos have been duped, act with more expediency and violently oppose their government to forcefully replace it with one they believe is proper. 

These people are what we recognize as terrorists or as Islamic revolutionaries depending on who you ask. 

RAND Audio on Iran.

I am beginning to think that using this as a depot for stuff we find interesting. And the occasional commentary.