'via Blog this'
Violating UN sanctions is something that China has ("allegedly") done numerous times. This would be in the specific case of DPRK and, more than likely, in Iran as well. China is known for this...at least in my circles. This article implicates Algeria and South Africa as well and while the Algeria connection might actually be more important for regional stability - lets focus on China.
This isn't a case of China allowing luxury goods into DPRK. Or even not fully implementing safeguards on transit lines outside of DPRK. Orrrrrr....not appropriately monitoring its airspace regarding incoming flights over China and into the DPRK, etc. If found to be true (and why would the TNC make this kind of thing up?) this is actually selling weapons in clear violation of UNSC sanctions to a vile dictator in the midst of an armed rebellion, using the authoritarian government next door as a middle-man.
$200 million can apparently buy you some pretty nifty equipment, too. Putting aside all the anti-tank missiles and truck-mounted rocket launchers (with that kind of weaponry, we'd have been looking at two Syrias...) lets talk about the QW-18.
The QW-18, as mentioned in the article, is very similar to the US's Stinger missile. The stinger is perhaps most famous for the role it played in Afghanistan in the eighties. Remember that? Russian helicopters...lightly armed mujahideen...I think we know where I'm going. Helicopter + Stinger = explosion and dead Russians. Well, that was then, this is now. Imagine if this arms deal had gone through. Algeria gets marching orders from China who tells them to deliver a bunch of high-powered weaponry. Algeria does, knowing that their good buddy, China, has their back and replenish their stocks. NATO sends in another bombing run to provide cover for the rebels but this time, instead of getting all-blowed-up, the Libyan military opens up their shiny, new QW-18s. The ramifications for NATO aircraft downed by Chinese materiel in Libyan airspace would be quite the fiasco, no? There would be a lot of questions to be asked and, of course, fewer answers given. I suppose we should be happy that scenario never played out. But, it would certainly be something to keep in mind as China continues it rapid growth both economically and militarily and begins to further assert itself (aggressively) on the international stage. (Yes, I know that in its history the US has done other crappy things - Iran/Contra, Arming Saddam, bankrolling the Egyptian military, etc, etc)
The QW-18, as mentioned in the article, is very similar to the US's Stinger missile. The stinger is perhaps most famous for the role it played in Afghanistan in the eighties. Remember that? Russian helicopters...lightly armed mujahideen...I think we know where I'm going. Helicopter + Stinger = explosion and dead Russians. Well, that was then, this is now. Imagine if this arms deal had gone through. Algeria gets marching orders from China who tells them to deliver a bunch of high-powered weaponry. Algeria does, knowing that their good buddy, China, has their back and replenish their stocks. NATO sends in another bombing run to provide cover for the rebels but this time, instead of getting all-blowed-up, the Libyan military opens up their shiny, new QW-18s. The ramifications for NATO aircraft downed by Chinese materiel in Libyan airspace would be quite the fiasco, no? There would be a lot of questions to be asked and, of course, fewer answers given. I suppose we should be happy that scenario never played out. But, it would certainly be something to keep in mind as China continues it rapid growth both economically and militarily and begins to further assert itself (aggressively) on the international stage. (Yes, I know that in its history the US has done other crappy things - Iran/Contra, Arming Saddam, bankrolling the Egyptian military, etc, etc)
While I have no doubt about the veracity of TGM claims about PRC at least proposing to funnel weapons into Libya, I am left wondering why members of the Politburo would think that it would be a good idea in the first place? What deniability would PRC have if weapons that were specifically prohibited from reaching Tripoli and Ghadaffi’s forces were used to their effect?
ReplyDeleteWhile at first I am somewhat impressed at the audacity of the move, I also sadly unsurprised that there has been no major fallout between the NATO community and China over the debacle. I find it hard to believe that would be the case if a Chinese illegally supplied asymmetrical weapon was used to carry out an attack on NATO forces, but thankfully we will never know what would have transpired.
As it stands, China has not faced any major fallout so far. If we believe that China felt that it would face no repercussions from the international community when it chose to offer weaponry, then when assessing its decisions calculus we are only left with the African ramifications. The article rightly points out that China is worried now about the fallout in Tripoli under the new regime and its access to Libyan oil. While I expect many economists and followers of real politik philosophy to agree that the Arms deal was an attempt to tip the scales in favor of China’s ally in the conflict, I propose another explanation that occurs concurrently with the classic resource grab argument.
I believe that the attempted arming of the Ghadaffi government was an attempt to not only shore up oil reserves, but to also nullify what China felt was Western attempts at supporting the democratic revolutions that have been sweeping Northern Africa. It was in China’s interest to halt or at least stall the Libyan revolution to prevent any victory in Libya from continuing the spark of revolution across Africa and the Middle East. Chinese intervention was not just about propping up Ghadaffi’s regime so that it could access resources, it was about preventing further instability in Africa, and preventing further Western action in Africa. If the NATO forces were repulsed by the SAMs, there is the possibility that they would be more hesitant to employ as much force to protect the rebels as they were doing, and would also weigh heavily on the minds of political and military elites when deciding whether to aid another rebel group in another African despotic country.
The decision to support Ghadaffi was not just about geo-economic planning, but about geo-politics. The ‘Arab Spring’ was hailed by commentators as proof that democratic transition could happen suddenly without much violence, wholly ignoring the Saudi backed suppression of activists in Bahrain, and the (presumably) Iranian backed suppression of activists in Syria. The message from Tunisia was “you can topple your government relatively easily” the message from Egypt was “it might not be easy, but the military will protect you” and the message from Libya was “even if the military attacks you, the international community will help”. A successful venture in Libya gives momentum to the next group seeking political change. However if the international community were taken out of the picture, then there was a chance that the Ghadaffi forces would succeed in stamping out the rebels. How to neutralize the NATO effort? Ground them. By arming the government with SAMs the Chinese sought to primarily stop the international forces, from both aiding the Libyan rebels, and entering in any other conflicts that would disrupt China’s sphere of influence in Africa.
ReplyDeleteAs much as the Arab Spring was a blow to US led exportation of democracy, it was just as significant a blow to nascent or developing economic Sino-African ties. Leaked cables show Chinese increased relationship talks with Tunisia, and China was dealing with the Egyptian government in its attempt to essentially buy up the Nile river for grain fields in Sudan and Ethiopia, etc.
China cannot afford to lose more and more allies to democratic reform. Of course I say all of this while acknowledging that the democratically elected governments might choose to continue business relations with China. The major issue for China in Africa is the ease and efficiency that it can extract resources. Embargoes, wars, and (non chinese supported) regional violence reduces the inflow of resources to the Chinese manufacturing plants on the Eastern Coast of China.
The battle in Tripoli was more than a source of oil for China, it was the beginning of a regional conflict that will determine how large and fast China can grow using African resources, and how much it can expand its sphere of influence outside the South East Asian continent.