Withdrawal in Afghanistan and Autonomous Recovery

So today we have another guest post. This post is from another friend of mine in my International Security class. Grant Hoheisel is, besides being a great guy, remarkably good at regression and econometric analysis. His topic for his professional paper (like a thesis) is, "Analyzing U.S. Rhetoric and Policy vis-a-vis China: Consistencies and Variances between G.W. Bush and the Obama Administrations." Although his paper topic is China, today he is writing about Afghanistan.

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After the fall of the World Trade Center in 2001, the United States commenced Operation Enduring Freedom on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan.  Eleven years of war has resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the dismantling of al-Qaeda leadership, and instituting a democratized government in Afghanistan.  Yet severe costs have also been incurred by the United States.  Nearly 2,000 American lives have been lost in a war which has cost U.S. taxpayers approximately $520 billion according to estimates by the National Priorities Project.  The Obama administration has announced the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom to occur at the end of 2014, completing the gradual withdrawal of 90,000 troops currently stationed throughout Afghanistan.  Disagreement with this policy has been vociferous, as many scholars and policymakers have suggested troop withdrawal will result in intensifying conflict and a failed Afghan state.  While this prediction is not out of the realm of possibility, dissenters fail to recognize the positive benefits associated with the current Afghanistan policy and the prospect of a successful nation-state recovery following a full-scale international withdrawal.

The United States has been engaged in ongoing guerrilla style warfare with Taliban and insurgent fighters since the overthrow of the Taliban regime.  Frankly, this is a losing battle.  According to Andrew Mack, powerful states with superior military capability frequently lose asymmetric wars to guerrilla and insurgent fighters.  Such losses occur because insurgent fighters do not aim to win the war militarily; rather, their tactics force prolonged wars of attrition which erode the occupying nation’s political will for warfare.  As Henry Kissinger laconically states about guerrilla warfare, “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.  The conventional army loses if it does not win.”  Large armies struggle to adapt to guerrilla warfare tactics of roadside bombings, hit and run attacks, and propaganda warfare which defy conventional warfare norms. Lyall and Wilson reinforce this notion with research demonstrating how powerful mechanized armies removed from the population they occupy fail to successfully collect intelligence and form positive relationships with local populations.  Powerful mechanized armies may then actually instigate an increased insurgency because fence-sitting locals will side with the insurgency rather than the occupying force.  These theories have come to fruition in Afghanistan where recent coordinated attacks by Taliban fighters in Afghan provinces and secure neighborhoods of Kabul have aimed to demonstrate the resiliency of the insurgent opposition and erode American political will.  It is clear that the United States faces another Vietnam-styled unwinnable war in which exorbitant financial costs and political disillusionment with war efforts have led to limited support at home.  Withdrawing troops by the end of 2014 will ensure the safety of U.S. personnel and mitigate financial losses.  However, an unexpected benefit of withdrawing forces from Afghanistan may be the establishment of a stabilized, self-reliant state.

Political research suggests that allowing conflicts to naturally unfold and conclude may actually be a successful policy option.  Edward Luttwak describes how war is a final arbiter which can permanently resolve conflicts and lead to peace.  Many times international intervention and the establishment of sustained international aid within conflict scenarios can inadvertently prolong warfare and create states or regions dependent upon foreign aid.  Afghanistan currently falls under Luttwak’s description, as a recent U.S. Senate Foreign Relations report states 97% of Afghanistan’s GDP is linked to U.S. military activities.  Undoubtedly, ending Operation Enduring Freedom will lead to an economic recession and some level of violent conflict in Afghanistan.  Yet temporary conflict and economic hardship may be the better alternative than sustained occupation and intervention. 

Additionally, Afghanistan may be able to achieve a more stable and flourishing peace following an uninterrupted conflict and recovery period than compared to continued or intermittent international intervention.  Jeremy Weinstein, following Luttwak’s logic, argues that under certain conditions nation states can autonomously recover, or “… achieve a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence, and postwar political and economic development in the absence of international intervention.”  The conditions to achieve autonomous recovery outlined by Weinstein are a significant threat to the survival of the group or state, a strong domestic revenue imperative, and no external means to reduce the cost of fighting for survival.  Such conditions will be present in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international forces.  The survival of the current government will be challenged by Taliban and insurgent fighters.  Afghanistan will desperately need to increase domestic revenue following the departure of the American-reinforced economy and a policy of committed withdrawal from the international community will offer no external means to reduce the cost of fighting for survival.  This will force the Afghan government to make decisions which guarantee the survival of the government and become self-reliant in rebuilding the nation.  Necessary taxation and economic redevelopment policy will result exogenous of international intervention.  Hence, by imposing the policy of withdrawal, the government of Afghanistan will be forced to autonomously make decisions to benefit the nation.  These decisions can lead to the most optimistic outcomes for a nation, as demonstrated by successful autonomous recoveries in Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia.

            Opponents to the 2014 withdrawal, such as Khalilzad and Blackwill, argue in separate Foreign Affairs articles that a civil war following the departure of international forces will lead to a reemergence of the Taliban regime, destabilization of the region, and trigger increased support for jihadist ideology. Their assumptions presume a Taliban victory over the established Afghan governmental army and assume an unwillingness of the Afghan people and government to return to a state of normalcy.  This is likely not the case.  Autonomous recovery is a viable policy option that opponents to the withdrawal policy have failed to recognize.  The current withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan is appropriate, as an ongoing occupation will continue to fuel the insurgency, place American lives into situations of unnecessary risk, and continue to accrue inordinate financial costs.  Removing the United States’ military presence from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will unquestionably eliminate the costs of war and may be the stimulus needed to achieve a successful Afghan state.

China is Not a Threat

As promised - a guest post.
Jan Saxhaug is a friend, classmate, and Rosenthal Fellow. He'll be interning with Senator Mark Udall this summer in DC. Just like I put up my Op-Ed the other day, Jan was nice enough to share his Op-Ed on the myths surrounding the rise of China (it's a little better than mine was...heh).
Drink it in and leave some comments!

China is Not a Threat

Recent opinion polls conducted by Gallup indicate an increasing paranoia amongst the U.S. populace regarding relations with China. This paranoia is perpetuated by three myths: China’s economic superiority, its military dominance, and the belief that its communist government is not conducive to peace.  These misconceptions are exaggerated by rhetoric from politicians such as Mitt Romney.  Romney often targets China as an economic, military, and political rival. In an op-ed written for The Wall Street Journal in February, Romney stated that, “the dawn of a Chinese century—and the end of an American one—is not inevitable. America possesses inherent strengths that grant us a competitive advantage over China and the rest of the world.”  This type of rhetoric frames the public debate around China in a competitive way, and the ramifications of such as attitude are far reaching, both domestically and internationally. For public misconceptions to change and U.S. – Chinese relations to improve, the rhetoric first needs to change from competitive to cooperative, and China’s economic growth, military power, and political stability need to be embraced.

Myth #1: China is the leading economic power in the world.

The current rhetoric has led to some troublesome misconceptions about China’s growth.  According to the Gallup poll, 53% of Americans see China as the leading economy in the world.  Politicians have capitalized on this by discussing U.S. – Chinese relations in a way that indicates this is a zero-sum game. It is true that China’s economic growth over the past 30 years has been astounding.  Since Deng Xiaoping began his economic reforms, China has seen its GDP soar, with growth hovering around 10% over the past decade.  However, China’s growth is not threatening to the U.S. In 2010 the U.S. GDP was still three times larger than China’s, and with1.13 billion people, China’s per capita income pales in comparison. Ultimately, China’s rapid growth, while extraordinary, is in line with other emerging markets, and due to the law diminishing returns is bound to level out in the near future. 

Comparisons aside, China is firmly emplaced as a global leader. China’s economy is so inherently tied to the rest of the world that conflict is highly unlikely.  Prominent political scientists such as Bruce Russett argue that economically advanced nations will view the cost/benefit ratio of war with other developed nations as extremely unattractive. As a result, developing nations will make rational decisions allowing them to continue their trajectory of growth.  It could be argued further that competition between the U.S. and China should not be feared; rather, it should be embraced.  As China’s population is lifted from poverty, vast new global markets will begin to open, increasing economic interconnectedness, and reducing the chances of armed conflict even further.

Myth #2: China’s military growth is a threat to U.S. national security.

51% of American adults view China’s military strength as a threat to U.S. national security. Prominent Realist scholar John Mearsheimer would explain this phenomenon as the tragedy of great power politics, which pits states against each other in a constant struggle for power at the other’s expense. This theory may have held during the Cold War, but times have changed. China is not building a military with the intent of overtaking the U.S. On the contrary, according to a recent essay in Foreign Affairs by Henry Kissinger, China’s efforts to expand its military capabilities are consistent with a growing world power.  In fact, he goes on to explain, what would be more alarming is if China chose not to increase its military capacity. Furthermore, China’s military spending, while high, still pales in comparison to the U.S., and its strategy is largely defensive and asymmetric in nature. Stephen Walt, another prominent realist from Harvard, would agree. He argues that the world is shifting towards multi-polarity, and the traditional view of China – U.S. relations does not work anymore because it ignores the evolving nature of global affairs. 

The bottom line is China has a right to maintain a military that is in line with its growing global influence, and to that end it has begun to play an increasing role in international humanitarian efforts. The U.S. has been the dominant power in Southeast Asia for the past 60 years. It is only natural that as China gains more global influence, that it try to bring more balance to its own backyard. Make no mistake, the U.S. is smart to “pivot” its strategy to Southeast Asia, but it does not want to force allies in Southeast Asia to choose sides. Political rhetoric and token deployments of U.S. troops may do just that.

Myth #3:  China’s government is not conducive to peace.

China’s communist regime has had its share of problems, but if it has been anything it has been stable.  China is on the dawn of a new five-year plan that will usher in a large-scale changeover of the power structure.  The Politburo and Standing Committee will receive a fresh batch of politicians that have grown up in a time of peace, and prosperity.  Liberal scholars have promoted the concept of the democratic peace, but China seems to be bending the rules, as their largely autocratic system of governance has brought on a period of great prosperity.  China still has its problems with a large, impoverished rural populace, and it is important for the U.S. to keep pressure on China for its human rights record.  But it is time to accept China for what it is: an autocratic system with a track record of recent success and a plan for the future. 

The public debate on China generally focuses on three areas: Economic competition, military growth, and China’s lack of a modern democracy.  More often than not, these three dimensions are framed in a negative light.  For U.S. – China relations to improve, the fundamental basis of the debate needs to change.  China needs to be embraced as an economic and military partner, and the U.S. needs to accept China’s government for what it is.  

36 Days PLUS

After posting the previous entry, it sparked a conversation in the comments of Facebook. It was suggested that I amend '36 days' with my additional inputs...but then I just kept writing more in response to additional questions/comments. So I thought that it maybe deserved its own additional entry. As always, thoughts and comments (either here or on Facebook) are highly encouraged. Also, on a side note, I hope to have a few 'guest posts' soon from other students' assignments!


In terms of whether or not I think Iran is a 'rational actor':
yes. as we all should.
The argument was frequently made that Kim Jong Il was crazy. I don't subscribe to that myself but I've certainly heard the argument. The Iranian regime is working towards goals that put it at odds with the Western powers certainly, however that in no way means they're irrational. ...IMO.

Regarding what Iran's main goals/core values might be (and again, I'm no 'Iran expert'):

I think that the majority of the Iranian people (granted the power of the 'Iranian people' vs the Iranian government might be negligible) want economic stability and opportunities. They want to do better than their parents did, that kind of thing. Middle classes all over the world seem to be remarkably similar. The Iranian government wants several things ranging from regional hegemony to security to access to the same opportunities for prosperity that other nations enjoy. The way to accomplish what both of these groups want is for Iran to stop enriching uranium to the 20% level. This is right around 9/10 of the way to weapons grade and that is - and has been - a redline for the P5+1 for as long as I can remember. 

Another step towards being reintegrated into the global economy - which would invariably achieve Iran's goals - is to sign 

the NPT's Additional Protocol and allow further inspections by the IAEA of their facilities. There have been several deals on the table allowing for economic ties between the West and Iran plus the provision of the medical isotopes they say they want, plus technological expertise and assistance in their pursuit of nuclear power. It has truly been all spelled out for them before and they haven't taken advantage. Granted all of this might be an argument against their rationality - but what that means is that they either want nuclear weapons (and therefore sanctions are completely warranted) or we somehow haven't found the right mix of carrots to offer...or there is simply too little trust between the parties to move forward. Hopefully its just a trust issue and diplomacy will work to build that...

In response to a question regarding regional hegemony, zero-sum games, and sanctions:

The deals ('deals' being different from sanctions) that were laid out in the past would have allowed for Iran to truly become a technological and energy hegemon in the area, IMO, rivaling Saudi Arabia. The nuclear technology assistance that we had on the table previously was relatively remarkable and would have more than likely allowed Iran to become a nuclear energy exporter. Unfortunately, the trust necessary was not there. If Iran doesn't trust us (because in many ways when they negotiate with the P5+1 they're just negotiating with us), then they won't send their enriched uranium to Russia (via Turkey). Why would they do that if they feel that we aren't going to hold up our end of the deal...? That's where we've been in the past and, honestly, if I were in Iran's shoes, I'd feel the same trepidation with dealing with the West. Additionally, the nuclear power program was much more popular in the past with the people of Iran. Again, assuming that they only want a power program (not a weapons program - and that's certainly debatable) the timing might be better now than ever before. While we are going through an election which will, unfortunately raise the pugnacious rhetoric, they are also going through an election. Ahmadinejad is out and his party is so tainted as to not have any of them get approved to run. Inflation is high. The Iranian economy as a whole is starting to feel the pressure of the sanctions so much that even Iranian officials are saying they have bite. So things should change - at least a little. Granted the Ayatollah is still in command, hence the title 'Supreme Leader' but I am still reasonably optimistic. We were finally able to get Japan to stop importing Iranian oil and I'm sure we're still working on India and China (although, IMO China is a lost cause on this issue). Plus, we have new financial sanctions which is what was needed all along. Rereading your comment, I don't think this actually answers your question regarding Iran's resilience + and the zero sum-ness. I think that the sanctions are starting to change their calculus on the black-and-white nature of the issue. Also, I don't think it hurts that our navies have actually worked together recently on the issue of piracy. Common ground and trust (with continued pressure) is needed to bring Iran in. This should be the end game. They're a big enough country and have influence already that if we could regain them as an ally in the region, it would be remarkable what we could accomplish. Granted an 'ally' is probably wishful thinking...one thing at a time...but, with our assistance and they're acquiescence on the 20% thing plus Obama and his harder line on Israel, I think that there might be unprecedented space for compromise.

36 Days

For my International Security class, we had to write an Op-Ed. This is mine...it is, predictably, about Iran/sanctions/nuclear weapons. Thoughts, concerns...?

36 Days

In the fall of 1962, John F Kennedy had 13 days to head off a nuclear crisis in Cuba. While we might not be looking nuclear disaster in the eye, there are now, in the spring of 2012, 36 days before the next round of talks with Iran regarding their nuclear program. Recent writing by Elliott Abrams on his Council on Foreign Relations blog would lead you to believe that nothing substantial has happened and that Iran is nefariously playing the West. Laura Rozen, on the other hand, writes that Lady Ashton, The EU’s Foreign Policy envoy has deftly used diplomacy to build rapport and trust among the parties and that the recent meetings in Istanbul were an important first step. In the spring of 2010, I was a part of the team that worked to implement new, more stringent United Nations sanctions on Iran. If this process taught me nothing, it taught me that diplomacy is hard work and requires patience, compromise, and a distinct lack of ego. Perhaps this is what unfolded in the closed-door meetings in Istanbul. So the question then becomes how can we see more progress in 36 days?

Before addressing what will happen on May 23, perhaps it would be a valuable exercise to explore further how we got to this situation in the first place. Certainly not all states possess nuclear weapons, why does Iran feel that it needs them? According to copious writing on the topic by Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, political scientists from Stanford and the University of Chicago respectively, there are four main reasons why a state would pursue the technically difficult path of nuclear weapons. States build nuclear weapons for security concerns, internal politics, prestige, and scientific capability. In the case of Iran, we can see almost all of these elements playing out in Technicolor. Iran has legitimate concerns regarding its security, the nuclear energy program was – until recently – remarkably politically popular, and Iran feels that it would gain a great deal of prestige from the completion of its nuclear endeavors.

While Waltz would argue that the spread of nuclear weapons could actually make the area safer – the logic being that two nuclear-armed states have never gone to war – no one could accurately predict how the addition of a viable nuclear energy/weapons program would change the region. This is the heart of the matter, the uncertainty. Due to actions by both Iran and the United States, there is a dearth of trust and rapport, without which any kind of diplomacy is that much harder. It has been noted through various outlets that the US Intelligence community is uncertain about the interest of Iran in actually making nuclear weapons or if they are simply interested in a nuclear energy program as they proclaim. It is because of a lack of trust and transparency that the P5+1 has to be so cautious in treating Iran’s legitimate right to nuclear energy as a potential nuclear weapons program.

Once trust is built, the real work can begin. This work starts with identifying common ground including: Ceasing enrichment at the Fordo facility and continuing to enrich uranium at lower levels within Iran. These are the points that the P5+1 and the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can agree on and should provide a valuable stepping-stone to a solution. It is the pressure brought by international sanctions that have made these recent negotiations possible and the gradual lifting of sanctions by the UN, US, and EU will allow for them to continuing serving as both stick and carrot. For example, lessening the sanctions imposed on Iran’s central bank as their supply of 20% enriched uranium is sent to another country.

There are certainly many, like Abrams noted above, that feel that the talks are not going to succeed and that Iran is just buying time to further some reprehensible nuclear goal. Matthew Kroenig famously wrote recently in Foreign Affairs that now is the time to strike Iran. Kroenig’s argument that attacking Iran was the “least bad option” was quickly countered by Colin Kahl (both of Georgetown University), in the pages of the same magazine. Instead of focusing on the ‘least bad option’ everyone involved in the process should be focusing on the best possible outcome of what could be a dangerous situation. Simply experiencing diplomatic failures in the past does not ensure them in the future.

The fact remains that disabling the nuclear progress that Iran has made would be extremely difficult. When Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear facility, as Kahl notes, it made them more determined to have a nuclear weapons program and they became even more secretive. The technology and nuclear know-how of Iran would remain long after the smoke cleared and the civilian deaths were tallied. The US, and all of those calling for an attack, need to learn from history instead of attempting to add to its blunders.

Dina Esfandiary of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, citing a recent Gallup poll, notes that Iranian public support for the nuclear energy program has dropped by 30% since 2010. This shows that the sanctions’ effects have started to impact Iranians more directly and they’re becoming much more concerned about trade and inflation than a nuclear program and national pride.

Sanctions work when patiently and emphatically enforced, providing for the changing of a regime’s calculus around a specific issue. They are not intended to force a country to stop their nuclear weapons program (or shelling civilians or crimes against humanity, etc). Rather, they are intended to extend the timeline for the development of nuclear capability, allowing diplomacy to reach a solution. It is this diplomacy that the P5+1 and Iran is rightly working towards now and the recent meetings in Istanbul provide a valuable foundation for further progress. It is diplomacy that will work to keep the Obama administration from confronting its own ’13 days’.

Ricks on Thucydides on Realism

Great article from FP's Tom Ricks about how far back Realism goes.  

Blogging Thucydides (IV): I think this may be the most brutal line I've ever read | The Best Defense

Machines that Kill

This is an extension of a summary paper that was written for a class so it references a presentation by a professor here at the University of Minnesota and his work on the legality of drone strikes. I found it an interesting topic and continued on past the one page limit so I thought I'd put it up here...

‘Machines that Kill’ (or, perhaps, ‘Skynet is coming, run for your lives’)

Drunk Predator Drone @drunkenpredator

guess what bitches I'M FLYING OVER SYRIA happy friday news dump

Earlier this week, Professor Oren Gross of the Institute for International Legal and Security Studies gave a presentation on ‘drones’ entitled, Machines that Kill. Prof Gross started out with a brief overview of war and how it has been an “integral part of mankind.” Of course, the classic example of the integration of war and technology is the longbow at the battle of Agincourt and Prof Oren dutifully recounted this story as he progressed through the ages, intertwining war and technology. A highlight for me was his recounting of PW Singer’s work (as I’m a huge fan) about the “stretching of the battlefield.” For example it took 500 Grecian Hoplites to cover the space of a football field but in today’s modern military environment of the networked ‘battle space’ one soldier could cover 780 football fields.

E-IR

Also, in case anyone actually is reading this, Erik was published(?) at E-IR!

Link to Article


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