Withdrawal in Afghanistan and Autonomous Recovery

So today we have another guest post. This post is from another friend of mine in my International Security class. Grant Hoheisel is, besides being a great guy, remarkably good at regression and econometric analysis. His topic for his professional paper (like a thesis) is, "Analyzing U.S. Rhetoric and Policy vis-a-vis China: Consistencies and Variances between G.W. Bush and the Obama Administrations." Although his paper topic is China, today he is writing about Afghanistan.

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After the fall of the World Trade Center in 2001, the United States commenced Operation Enduring Freedom on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan.  Eleven years of war has resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the dismantling of al-Qaeda leadership, and instituting a democratized government in Afghanistan.  Yet severe costs have also been incurred by the United States.  Nearly 2,000 American lives have been lost in a war which has cost U.S. taxpayers approximately $520 billion according to estimates by the National Priorities Project.  The Obama administration has announced the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom to occur at the end of 2014, completing the gradual withdrawal of 90,000 troops currently stationed throughout Afghanistan.  Disagreement with this policy has been vociferous, as many scholars and policymakers have suggested troop withdrawal will result in intensifying conflict and a failed Afghan state.  While this prediction is not out of the realm of possibility, dissenters fail to recognize the positive benefits associated with the current Afghanistan policy and the prospect of a successful nation-state recovery following a full-scale international withdrawal.

The United States has been engaged in ongoing guerrilla style warfare with Taliban and insurgent fighters since the overthrow of the Taliban regime.  Frankly, this is a losing battle.  According to Andrew Mack, powerful states with superior military capability frequently lose asymmetric wars to guerrilla and insurgent fighters.  Such losses occur because insurgent fighters do not aim to win the war militarily; rather, their tactics force prolonged wars of attrition which erode the occupying nation’s political will for warfare.  As Henry Kissinger laconically states about guerrilla warfare, “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.  The conventional army loses if it does not win.”  Large armies struggle to adapt to guerrilla warfare tactics of roadside bombings, hit and run attacks, and propaganda warfare which defy conventional warfare norms. Lyall and Wilson reinforce this notion with research demonstrating how powerful mechanized armies removed from the population they occupy fail to successfully collect intelligence and form positive relationships with local populations.  Powerful mechanized armies may then actually instigate an increased insurgency because fence-sitting locals will side with the insurgency rather than the occupying force.  These theories have come to fruition in Afghanistan where recent coordinated attacks by Taliban fighters in Afghan provinces and secure neighborhoods of Kabul have aimed to demonstrate the resiliency of the insurgent opposition and erode American political will.  It is clear that the United States faces another Vietnam-styled unwinnable war in which exorbitant financial costs and political disillusionment with war efforts have led to limited support at home.  Withdrawing troops by the end of 2014 will ensure the safety of U.S. personnel and mitigate financial losses.  However, an unexpected benefit of withdrawing forces from Afghanistan may be the establishment of a stabilized, self-reliant state.

Political research suggests that allowing conflicts to naturally unfold and conclude may actually be a successful policy option.  Edward Luttwak describes how war is a final arbiter which can permanently resolve conflicts and lead to peace.  Many times international intervention and the establishment of sustained international aid within conflict scenarios can inadvertently prolong warfare and create states or regions dependent upon foreign aid.  Afghanistan currently falls under Luttwak’s description, as a recent U.S. Senate Foreign Relations report states 97% of Afghanistan’s GDP is linked to U.S. military activities.  Undoubtedly, ending Operation Enduring Freedom will lead to an economic recession and some level of violent conflict in Afghanistan.  Yet temporary conflict and economic hardship may be the better alternative than sustained occupation and intervention. 

Additionally, Afghanistan may be able to achieve a more stable and flourishing peace following an uninterrupted conflict and recovery period than compared to continued or intermittent international intervention.  Jeremy Weinstein, following Luttwak’s logic, argues that under certain conditions nation states can autonomously recover, or “… achieve a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence, and postwar political and economic development in the absence of international intervention.”  The conditions to achieve autonomous recovery outlined by Weinstein are a significant threat to the survival of the group or state, a strong domestic revenue imperative, and no external means to reduce the cost of fighting for survival.  Such conditions will be present in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international forces.  The survival of the current government will be challenged by Taliban and insurgent fighters.  Afghanistan will desperately need to increase domestic revenue following the departure of the American-reinforced economy and a policy of committed withdrawal from the international community will offer no external means to reduce the cost of fighting for survival.  This will force the Afghan government to make decisions which guarantee the survival of the government and become self-reliant in rebuilding the nation.  Necessary taxation and economic redevelopment policy will result exogenous of international intervention.  Hence, by imposing the policy of withdrawal, the government of Afghanistan will be forced to autonomously make decisions to benefit the nation.  These decisions can lead to the most optimistic outcomes for a nation, as demonstrated by successful autonomous recoveries in Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia.

            Opponents to the 2014 withdrawal, such as Khalilzad and Blackwill, argue in separate Foreign Affairs articles that a civil war following the departure of international forces will lead to a reemergence of the Taliban regime, destabilization of the region, and trigger increased support for jihadist ideology. Their assumptions presume a Taliban victory over the established Afghan governmental army and assume an unwillingness of the Afghan people and government to return to a state of normalcy.  This is likely not the case.  Autonomous recovery is a viable policy option that opponents to the withdrawal policy have failed to recognize.  The current withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan is appropriate, as an ongoing occupation will continue to fuel the insurgency, place American lives into situations of unnecessary risk, and continue to accrue inordinate financial costs.  Removing the United States’ military presence from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will unquestionably eliminate the costs of war and may be the stimulus needed to achieve a successful Afghan state.