Friday, February 17, 2012

Machines that Kill

This is an extension of a summary paper that was written for a class so it references a presentation by a professor here at the University of Minnesota and his work on the legality of drone strikes. I found it an interesting topic and continued on past the one page limit so I thought I'd put it up here...


‘Machines that Kill’ (or, perhaps, ‘Skynet is coming, run for your lives’)

guess what bitches I'M FLYING OVER SYRIA happy friday news dump


Earlier this week, Professor Oren Gross of the Institute for International Legal and Security Studies gave a presentation on ‘drones’ entitled, Machines that Kill. Prof Gross started out with a brief overview of war and how it has been an “integral part of mankind.” Of course, the classic example of the integration of war and technology is the longbow at the battle of Agincourt and Prof Oren dutifully recounted this story as he progressed through the ages, intertwining war and technology. A highlight for me was his recounting of PW Singer’s work (as I’m a huge fan) about the “stretching of the battlefield.” For example it took 500 Grecian Hoplites to cover the space of a football field but in today’s modern military environment of the networked ‘battle space’ one soldier could cover 780 football fields.

Friday, February 10, 2012

E-IR

Also, in case anyone actually is reading this, Erik was published(?) at E-IR!

Link to Article


Go check it out!

Salifi Categorization

Recently found a great article on Salafist groups, the biggest thing I found interesting about it was this:

The different contextual readings have produced three major factions in the com- munity: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. The purists emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast, emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolu- tion. All three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief. 

Then I found another article (this time a capstone project from GWU) that had summary of it with further explanation of the groups and their attitudes towards each other. The best bits I have below, but it seems that there is some literature that explains differing motivations of Islamic groups not by their interpretation of Islam, but by their differing opinions of their capability to influence change. It solidifies the view of Terrorism as being an (objectively abhorrent from the outsiders perspective) extension of political action in the mind of the actor.



 Salafis believe that their “actions should not create a greater evil, such as weakening Islamic (Salafi) propagation” and they are against declaring the state an infidel because that leads to reprisals, which are a “greater evil.” Thus, purists are not above attempting to influence the state, but it should be through a mass movement of “believers,” gained through propagation, not through political action, which leads to corruption, or violence, which puts the Muslim community in danger.




Essentially the purists feel that extending civil society and their control over the public sphere to institute change.


 About politicos:


politicos do not challenge the purists on the Salafi creed; rather, they believe that that purists’ rejection of modern politics has made them irrelevant and out of touch with Muslims. Since physically combating the state would lead to more problems, they believe that the only way to remain relevant, incite change, and gain power is through participating in politics. 


engagement with the state is imperative here. I have nothing other than a hunch to back this up, but I feel that this cadre attracts more moderate muslim participants. If anyone has anything to support this I would love to know for certain. 




And finally the Jihadis:



believing the purists and politicos have been duped, act with more expediency and violently oppose their government to forcefully replace it with one they believe is proper. 

These people are what we recognize as terrorists or as Islamic revolutionaries depending on who you ask. 



Friday, February 3, 2012

RAND Audio on Iran.

I am beginning to think that using this as a depot for stuff we find interesting. And the occasional commentary.

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Obama's hypocrisy on Iran...?


It was brought up in a class of mine that Obama was being hypocritical in his recent SOTU speech. A student in my International Security class mentioned that Obama had stated that “all options are on the table” when dealing with the threat of a nuclear Iran. Another student stated that the sentence right after that (I didn’t watch as I have a ridiculous amount to reading to do) was that “…the United States is still open to engagement with the Iranian regime.” The discussion then revolved around Obama’s supposed hypocrisy, Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism, and the difference between what politicians say and what politicians do (particularly in the US).

Thursday, January 12, 2012

The 20 Percent Solution - By Olli Heinonen | Foreign Policy

The 20 Percent Solution - By Olli Heinonen | Foreign Policy: "What has raised the world's suspicions is that Iran continues to produce 20 percent enriched uranium despite the fact that this exceeds its civilian needs and, as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged in September, does not make economic sense."

It comes down to capability and motivation. If you shroud your capability in secrecy, we will assume the worst in terms of motivation. Viewed in this context, Iran could sign 50 NPTs and it wouldn't really help...

'via Blog this'

Monday, September 19, 2011

State Directed Development


The dominant thinking of the Cold War era was to spread capitalism around the globe. The dominant philosophy of the times being that government was not the solution, but the problem. In its attempt to assist countries develop, the International Monetary Fund implemented policies that forced developing countries to  adopt a neo-liberal approach of economic development. The neo-liberal approach attempts to: reduce the size of government, limit the power of organized labor, open up markets, and stabilize and globalize currency. The thought process was that governments misappropriate resources, and use economic power to further their own goals instead of long term economic development. Atul Kohli in his book State Directed Development argues that there is no evidence that countries with smaller government authorities are more able to develop and industrialize. His argument is that the main factor is the efficacy of the state and state planning that determines the success of economic growth among late-late developers. 

Kohli argues that there are three ideal types of economic regimes in development economics. He uses the term ideal not to mean most beneficial but he means historic patterns of how “state authority is organized and used in the developing world”. At one end he finds the cohesive-capitalist state, at the other the neopatrimonial state. These two extremes will be the models we use in this discussion. Kohli argues that a neopatrimonial state is one where the separation of private and public realms is either weak or nonexistent. His argument is that in developing states with large amounts of political instability where the realms of the private domain and the public domain are blurred, there is an incentive for those in power to use their limited and unstable tenure as a mechanism for rapid wealth accumulation. This is an example of poor governance.

 Good governance is an important factor in discussing economic development. Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal argue in their article Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for a New Aid Agenda that “The emphasis has shifted from determining the ‘right’ role for the state… to questions about commitment and capacity”. In other words, the global community shifted from focusing on procedure, to focusing on economic outcomes. This shift is in line with calls from economist Amartya Sen in his book Development as Freedom that the problem with libertarian economics is that it is procedure based instead of outcome based. Of the various outcomes, Kohli argues that the states that have had the best outcomes have been the cohesive-capitalist states. Kohli argues that the state that illustrates both cohesion of power, and capitalistic institutions will be the most successful. 

The first element of cohesiveness is a discussion of the nature of the government. Kohli says that these states are “characterized by cohesive politics, that is, by centralized and purposive authority structures that often penetrate deep into the society”. Kohli argues that the states that have developed rapidly in the past fifty years are those with governments that forge bonds with the nations major economic groups and co-opt their resources into the goals of the state, and maintain a strict control over labor. Kohli argues that it is this state capacity to co-opt and control multiple levels of the economy that allows it do direct it in a manner far more apt to industrialization than the free market could. He attests that “for better or for worse, these states have also proved to be the most successful agents of deliberate state-led industrialization in peripheral countries”